The Role of Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking by Tabb, William Murray
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 4
The Role of Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling
Public Veto with Public Participation in
Environmental Decisionmaking
William Murray Tabb
Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
William Murray Tabb, The Role of Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public
Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 21 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 175 (1997),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol21/iss1/4
THE ROLE OF CoNTRovERsY IN NEPA: RECONCILING PUBLIC




The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") promotes a
national policy of encouraging the "productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment."' The Act seeks, through various "action-
forcing" procedures,2 to infuse a philosophy of balancing environmental
values with other considerations in the decisionmaking process of federal
agencies.3 The second purpose of the Act is to engage the public in the
agency deliberative process.4 Although NEPA calls for a significant role for
public participation in the decisionmaking process by federal agencies, the
nature and extent of that requirement is not definitive either under the statute
itself or under the interpretive Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")
regulations.5 Instead, the degree of the public role generally falls within the
ambit of agency discretion.6
* William Murray Tabb is a Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma College of
Law. He holds a B.A. from the University of Arkansas (1974); a M.A. from the University
of Arkansas (1976); a J.D. from the University of Arkansas School of Law (1982); and a
L.L.M. from the University of Illinois College of Law. Professor Tabb is currently the
Director of the Department of Justice Internship Program for the Environmental
Enforcement Division in Washington, D.C., and has taught at Baylor University School of
Law (1986-1990).
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
2 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 n.18 (1976) (stating that the term "action-
forcing" reflects NEPA's policy, embodied in section 102(2)(C), to infuse consideration of
environmental values within the decisionmaking process of all federal agencies); see also
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); 40 C.F.R. §
1500.1(a) (1996). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Stephen R. Brown, Pluralism and
the Environment: The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 277 (1990).
3 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
4 See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349.
See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517.
6 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989).
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In some instances, where information is communicated to the public
regarding a proposed major federal action, the response may be largely
negative. The agency is then placed in the difficult position of having to
respond to the controversial issues raised with reasoned support for the
government actions. Consequently, although NEPA aims to include the
public in various ways both in the disclosure of information and in the
solicitation of input, the agencies actually have a marked disincentive to
pursue public involvement. This is because the practical effect of
controversy, if it rises to a certain level, is that the agency may be required
to undertake additional duties of study and analysis. Obviously such
obligations impede government actions and may ultimately affect the
decisions reached pertaining to the project.
Because the nature of agency decisionmaking typically is informal
and the mandate of NEPA is seen principally as procedural rather than
substantive,7 agencies can avoid controversial issues to some extent by
limiting public involvement. Moreover, where courts view opposition to
government proposals in narrow terms, the public voice in NEPA is lessened.
At some point, the public's ability to influence agency decisionmaking may
become so limited that the statutory policy favoring public inclusion is
eviscerated. Courts have recognized the reality of "bureaucratic momentum"
that may occur whereby one decision by an administrative agency inexorably
leads to and justifies the next, ultimately like a "domino effect" unless
checked.8 The NEPA public participation model partially addresses this
concern by interjecting the public role at various pressure points.
A principled approach is needed which reconciles the dual aims of
7 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). The Court stated:
NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. It is to ensure a fully
informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision the
judges of the Court of Appeals or this Court would have reached had they
been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency. Administrative
decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for
substantive reasons as mandated by statute, not simply because the court
is unhappy with the result reached.
Id. (citations omitted).
8 See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
that bureaucratic rationalization and momentum are "real dangers" to be anticipated and
avoided); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (lst Cir. 1983).
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NEPA--ensuring appropriate and timely agency consideration of
environmental effects of major projects while also adequately providing
information to the public regarding the potential environmental impacts. Part
II will briefly explore the decisionmaking process under NEPA, highlighting
the opportunities for public involvement. Part III addresses the statutory
system of agency decisionmaking based upon the significance of major
federal projects. Part IV examines one critical aspect of the determination of
significance involving controversial issues within the meaning of the
interpretive CEQ regulations.9 A multi-factored test will be proposed in Part
IV to guide federal agencies and reviewing courts when evaluating whether
opposition to a major federal project is "highly controversial" for purposes
of affecting agency duties under NEPA.
II. THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MODEL AND THE EIS PROCESS
NEPA requires that federal agencies proposing "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" include in their
proposals or recommendations a "detailed statement" which provides an
assessment of the beneficial and adverse environmental effects of the
proposed action.'0  Where an agency concludes that a project is
9 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (1996).
10 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), which states in relevant part:
All agencies of the Federal Government shall -
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved. Copies of such statements and the
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
"insignificant," its duties of investigation and analysis are more limited under
the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. Groups with concerns
that such government conclusions may effectively cut out meaningful public
participation and the opportunity to challenge agency assumptions face
various barriers to halt the bureaucratic steamroller.
First, the nature and extent of public participation under NEPA is
generally committed to agency discretion. Second, the issue of whether a
particular project will have a significant effect on the environment is a
substantive issue which has been traditionally left to the informed discretion
of the agency proposing the action." NEPA does, however, provide a
procedural framework within which substantive judgments must be made. 2
The role of the courts overseeing agency compliance with NEPA is limited
to ensuring that the agency has complied with the procedural duties mandated
by the Act within the framework of meeting the substantive purposes or goals
of the statute. 3 Finally, the agency's determination of "no significant
impact" is neither a rulemaking nor an adjudicatory function, but rather a
factual finding subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial
review."4  NEPA provides four major opportunities for comment and
participation by other agencies and, to a lesser extent, by the public, on
agency proposals. 5 Unless a document has been publicly circulated and
available for public comment, it does not satisfy NEPA's EIS requirements. 6
comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies,
which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards,
shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review process.
1 See Sierra Club v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir.
1983); see also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453
F.2d 463, 480 (2d Cir. 1971).
12 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976).
13 See Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406 n.15.
14 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989). The court must
ensure that the agency took a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of its actions
by carefully reviewing the record to determine whether the agency decision is "founded on
a reasoned evaluation of the 'relevant factors."' Id. at 378 (quoting Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
'5 See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1996).
16 See Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 951 (1st Cir. 1983); see also 40 C.F.R. §§
1502.1, 1503.1, 1506.6.
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Agencies are further directed by the applicable CEQ regulations to make
"diligent efforts" to engage the public in compliance with the NEPA process,
although the exact steps are left to the agency's discretion. 7
17 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6. "Public involvement" is described as:
Agencies shall:
(a) Make diligent efforts to involve the public in preparing and
implementing their NEPA procedures.
(b) Provide public notice of NEPA-related hearings, public meetings, and
the availability of environmental documents so as to inform those persons
and agencies who may be interested or affected.
(1) In all cases the agency shall mail notice to those who have
requested it on an individual action.
(2) In the case of an action with effects of national concern notice
shall include publication in the Federal Register and notice by mail
to national organizations reasonably expected to be interested in the
matter and may include listing in the 102 Monitor. An agency
engaged in rulemaking may provide notice by mail to national
organizations who have requested that notice regularly be provided.
Agencies shall maintain a list of such organizations.
(3) In the case of an action with effects primarily of local concern the
notice may include:
(i) Notice to State and area wide clearinghouses pursuant to
OMB Circular A-95 (Revised).
(ii) Notice to Indian tribes when effects may occur on
reservations.
(iii) Following the affected State's public notice procedures for
comparable actions.
(iv) Publication in local newspapers (in papers of general
circulation rather than legal papers).
(v) Notice through other local media.
(vi) Notice to potentially interested community organizations
including small business associations.
(vii) Publication in newsletters that may be expected to reach
potentially interested persons.
(viii) Direct mailing to owners and occupants of nearby or
affected property.
(ix) Posting of notice on and off site in the area where the action
is to be located.
(c) Hold or sponsor public hearings or public meetings whenever
appropriate or in accordance with statutory requirements applicable to the
agency. Criteria shall include whether there is:
(1) Substantial environmental controversy concerning the proposed
action or substantial interest in holding the hearing.
1997]
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NEPA also requires the circulation of draft impact assessments for
comment by appropriate federal agencies with expertise in aspects of the
subject matter of the proposal. 8 Where a project implicates several agencies,
CEQ regulations provide for the designation of a "lead agency" which
assumes primary responsibility for preparing an impact statement and for
supervising the process.'9 The regulations also provide for the participation
throughout the process by other agencies with special expertise with respect
to an environmental issue implicated in the proposal.2°
The process leading to the finalization of an environmental impact
statement ("EIS") involves a number of steps and permits a wide range of
parties the opportunity to comment. The CEQ regulations outline specific
procedural steps that are binding on all federal agencies guiding them through
the environmental impact statement process. 21 The CEQ regulations direct
federal agencies to develop procedures to classify proposals in order to
streamline the process. 22 Agencies are instructed to establish criteria for
identifying actions that typically fall into one of the following categories: (1)
(2) A request for a hearing by another agency with jurisdiction over
the action supported by reasons why a hearing will be helpful. If a
draft environmental impact statement is to be considered at a public
hearing, the agency should make the statement available to the public
at least 15 days in advance (unless the purpose of the hearing is to
provide information for the draft environmental impact statement).
(d) Solicit appropriate information from the public.
(e) Explain in its procedures where interested persons can get information
or status reports on environmental impact statements and other elements
of the NEPA process.
(f) Make environmental impact statements, the comments received, and
any underlying documents available to the public pursuant to the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), without
regard to the exclusion for interagency memoranda where such
memoranda transmit comments of Federal agencies on the environmental
impact of the proposed action. Materials to be made available to the
public shall be provided to the public without charge to the extent
practicable, or at a fee which is not more than the actual costs of
reproducing copies required to be sent to other Federal agencies,
including the Council.
t See id. § 1501.4(b).
,9 See id. § 1501.5.
20 See id. § 1501.6.
2! See id. § 1500.3.
22 See id. § 1507.3(a).
180 [Vol.21:175
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those which normally require an environmental impact statement; (2) those
which ordinarily will not necessitate either an EIS or an environmental
assessment ("EA"); and (3) those which normally require an EA but do not
necessarily lead to preparation of an EIS. 3 Since many routine agency
actions normally do not individually or cumulatively cause significant
environmental impacts, these may be excepted from the NEPA process as
"categorical exclusions. '"24
The environmental impact statement process serves as evidence that
a federal agency has appropriately considered and weighed the reasonably
foreseeable environmental impacts of a proposed major action in a timely
fashion before making a decision to undertake that action. 25 The publication
of drafts of the EIS also serves a "larger informational role" by giving
assurance to the public that the federal agency has appropriately considered
environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.26
The NEPA process begins at the "threshold" stage, where the CEQ
regulations provide that the lead agency consult with other agencies in
deciding whether to prepare an EIS.27 The agency is directed to involve other
agencies and the general public in preparation of an environmental
assessment "to the extent practicable. '28 The agency evaluation process
begins with the preparation of an environmental assessment, which is a
23 See id. § 1507.3(b)(2).
24 See id. §§ 1508.4, 1507.3; see also Landmark West! v. United States Postal Serv., 840
F. Supp. 994, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
23 See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972).
26 In Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989), the Court stated:
The statutory requirement that a federal agency contemplating a major
action prepare such an environmental impact statement serves NEPA's
"action-forcing" purposes in two important respects. It ensures that the
agency . . . will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed
information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also
guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the
larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking
process and the implementation of that decision.
Id. (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 97 (1983) (citations omitted); see also Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace
Education Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981)).
27 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b).
2 See id. § 1501.4(b). Comments are solicited from federal agencies with jurisdiction by
law (approve, veto, or finance), and from state and local agencies and Indian tribes. See id.
§ 1503.1(a)(2).
1997]
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"concise public document" used to determine whether a sufficient likelihood
of significant environmental consequences exists to necessitate completion
of a more in-depth study of the project in an EIS.29  The EA contains
evidence and analysis pertaining to the proposal and considers, in abbreviated
fashion, alternatives to the proposed action which are required pursuant to
section 102(2)(E).3 ° An agency then will either proceed with preparation of
a draft EIS or make a finding of no significant impact ("FONSI") available
to the public.3 A practical effect of a determination of "no significant
impact" is that it limits agency responsibility to investigate, study, consider
alternatives to, and disclose to the public, the potential adverse effects of a
project.
The second stage in the EIS process, called "scoping,"3 2 involves
identification of the significant issues raised by the proposed project and
engaging participation by other agencies and interested persons in planning
the EIS at an early stage. The range of topics for consideration are narrowed
in order to focus discussion, timetables are established, and responsibilities
are allocated among various agencies. The scope of the impact statement
must include connected, cumulative, and similar actions.33 Various
29 See id. § 1508.9(a). In Cronin v. United States Dep 't ofAgric., 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.
1990), an environmental assessment was described as a "rough cut, low budget
environmental impact statement designed to show whether a full-fledged environmental
impact statement-which is very costly and time-consuming to prepare and has been the kiss
of death to many a federal project-is necessary." Id. at 443; see also Sierra Club v. Marsh,
769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985) (describing the different roles of the EA and the EIS).
An EA aims simply to identify (and assess the "significance" of) potential
impacts on the environment; it does not balance the different kinds of
positive and negative environmental effects, one against the other; nor
does it weigh negative environmental impacts against a project's other
objectives, such as, for example, economic development. This latter
balancing job belongs to the officials who decide whether to approve the
project; and (where there are "significant effects") those officials should
make the decision in light of an EIS. An EIS helps them make their
decision by describing and evaluating the project's likely effects on the
environment. The purpose of an EA is simply to help the agencies decide
if an EIS is needed.
Id. at 875.
30 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9(b).
3' See id. § 1501.4(e)(1).
32 See id. § 1501.7.
3 See id. § 1508.25(a).
[Vol.21:175
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alternatives are also discussed, including taking no action, other reasonable
courses of action, and mitigation measures that are not already included in the
proposal.34 The agency must examine direct, indirect, and cumulative
environmental impacts potentially resulting from the project.35
The next stage involves the actual preparation of the draft impact
statement, which is then circulated to appropriate agencies with jurisdiction
or special expertise and other parties for comment. 36 Following the comment
period, the lead agency prepares a final environmental impact statement.37
The final EIS addresses the criteria enumerated in section 102(2)(C) and
responds to comments received regarding alternatives to the proposed action
which had not already been given serious consideration by the agency.3 The
agency, after reaching a final decision on the proposed project, must prepare
a record of decision summarizing and justifying the actions to be undertaken,
and explaining why alternatives and mitigation measures were rejected.39
The distinctions between an environmental assessment and an
environmental impact statement are substantial. An agency uses the shorter
EA format to study and analyze impacts and alternatives to a proposed
project to determine whether a more "detailed" comprehensive analysis in an
EIS is warranted.4" The detailed statement required by section 102(2)(C)
31 See id. § 1508.25(b).
" See id. § 1508.25(c).
36 The draft is subject to public and interagency comments for at least 45 days. See id. §§
1503.1, 1503.4, 1506.10(d).
" The agency must wait 30 days after filing notice in Federal Register. See id. § 1506.10.
The CEQ serves as a clearinghouse to handle and resolve major interagency disagreements.
See id. §§ 1504.1-1504.3.
31 See id. § 1503.4(a).
31 See id. § 1505.1.
40 One court explained the breadth of an EIS as follows:
An EIS must include a discussion of not only the expected environmental
impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects, and any
alternatives to the proposed action, but also more "cosmic"
considerations. These considerations include the relationship between
short-term and long-term uses of the environment; any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources that would follow upon
implementation of the proposal; the effects on surrounding cultural,
historical, and ecological resources; the degree to which the project might
be "controversial"; the extent to which the project might impose
"uncertain or unknown risks" upon the environment; whether the action
might establish a precedent for future actions; and the degree to which the
1997]
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serves several functions. 4' It provides "full disclosure ' 42 of all information
pertaining to significant environmental impacts of major federal projects for
the benefit of the wider audience of the public and other governmental
units.43 A reviewing court then may ascertain whether the federal agency has
made a good faith effort to discharge its obligations under NEPA of
investigation, analysis, and reasoning to support its decisionmaking.4
project, while insignificant in itself, might be significant when considered
in connection with other similar actions.
Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 741 (3d
Cir. 1982) (summarizing 42 U.S.C. § 102(2)(C) and 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1981)).
41 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1.
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as
an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the
Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government. It shall provide full and fair discussion of significant
environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of
the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse
impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment. Agencies shall
focus on significant environmental issues and alternatives and shall reduce
paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data.
Statements shall be concise, clear, and to the point, and shall be supported
by evidence that the agency has made the necessary environmental
analyses. An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure
document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other
relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.
Id.
42 The CEQ regulations provide that the EIS must be "concise, clear and to the point," id.
§ 1500.2(b), "analytic rather than encyclopedic," id. § 1502.2(a), and "written in plain
language." Id. § 1502.8; see also Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzma, 817 F.2d 484, 493-94
(9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the agency must present the information in an EIS in such a
manner that government decisionmakers and interested non-professionals can readily
understand the scientific data and analysis).
4" See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973).
4 See id. at 1284-85, where the court stated:
Finally, and perhaps most substantively, the requirement of a detailed
statement helps insure the integrity of the process of decision by
precluding stubborn problems or serious criticism from being swept under
the rug. A conclusory statement "unsupported by empirical or
experimental data, scientific authorities, or explanatory information of any
kind" not only fails to crystallize issues, but "affords no basis for a
comparison of the problems involved with the proposed project and the
difficulties involved in the alternatives." Moreover, where comments
from responsible experts or sister agencies disclose new or conflicting
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Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA also directs federal agencies that are
preparing an environmental impact statement to obtain comments from other
federal agencies with "jurisdiction by law or special expertise" regarding the
subject matter under consideration.45 The participation contemplated by
section 102(2)(C) is augmented by section 309 of the Clean Air Act46 which
authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to review and
comment on the environmental impact of federal actions affecting
environmental quality. The intent of section 309 is to make environmental
agencies "effective participants" in the government's decisionmaking process
and to assure consideration of their views by "mission-oriented" federal
agencies. 47 The EPA must refer proposals to the CEQ where it considers the
merits unsatisfactory from the perspective of public health or welfare or
environmental quality. The CEQ regulations specify procedures for review
of an EPA determination that a proposed action is unsatisfactory. 48 The CEQ
also allows such referral by other federal agencies.49 The EPA's comments
are made publicly available upon conclusion of review.
III. SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTROVERSY IN THE NEPA PROCESS
The determination that a project is "significant" under section
102(2)(C) of NEPA is a threshold issue which directs the future course of
both substantive and procedural agency duties and the correlative degree of
public involvement. The statutory balance of making the agency
data or opinions that cause concern that the agency may not have fully
evaluated the project and its alternatives, these comments may not simply
be ignored. There must be good faith, reasoned analysis in response.
Id. (citations omitted).
41 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6.
46 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (1994).
41 See Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 475-76 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the
determination by EPA that EIS was unsatisfactory did not preclude the agency from
proceeding with plans for oil and gas sale but did give rise to heightened obligation to
explain justification for proceeding with the action); see also William L. Andreen, In Pursuit
of NEPA's Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of
Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J. 205 (1988); Martin Healy, The Environmental Protection
Agency's Duty to Oversee NEPA 's Implementation. Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 3
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,071 (1973).
41 See 40 C.F.R. § 1504.
41 See id. § 1504.1(c).
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decisionmaking process hinge on the threshold determination of
"significance" effectively reflects a compromise by ensuring that only those
projects which pose the most potentially serious impacts are evaluated
comprehensively, thus using limited agency resources the most efficiently.
The statutory notion of significance thus permits the agency to proceed with
decisions expeditiously and avoid excessive costs and delays in project
implementation.
The evaluation of which aspects of a proposed major federal project
are considered significant for NEPA decisionmaking purposes has been
described as "chameleon-like," turning on the context of the action relative
to the setting.5" NEPA requires federal agencies to make numerous judgment
calls regarding whether a project presents sufficient environmental impacts
to justify preparation of an EIS. 51 The difficulty of such line-drawing
determinations is compounded in that the variety of projects within the scope
of NEPA has been described as "as broad as the mind can conceive."52
The CEQ regulations which interpret the meaning of "significantly"53
50 See Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting); see also Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1052-53 (5th Cir.
1985).
"' In Coalition on Sensible Transp. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court
described the agency task as follows:
The NEPA process involves an almost endless series of judgment calls.
Here we consider ones relating to the detail in which specific items should
be discussed and the agencies' treatment of the project's relation to other
government activities. It is of course always possible to explore a subject
more deeply and to discuss it more thoroughly. The line-drawing
decisions necessitated by this fact of life are vested in the agencies, not
the courts.
Id. at 66.
52 Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1975).
5 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27, which provides:
"Significantly" as used in NEPA requires considerations of both context
and intensity:
(a) Context. This means that the significance of an action must be
analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human,
national), the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality.
Significance varies with the setting of the proposed action. For
instance, in the case of a site-specific action, significance would
usually depend upon the effects in the locale rather than in the world
as a whole. Both short- and long-term effects are relevant.
(b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of impact. Responsible
[Vol.21:175
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provide that one factor in that evaluation process involves the extent to which
the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be "highly
controversial."54  Courts have struggled, however, in determining the
character and degree of controversies that suffice to affect the assessment of
significance for purposes of determining the type of agency duties under
officials must bear in mind that more than one agency may make
decisions about partial aspects of a major action. The following
should be considered in evaluating intensity:
(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A
significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes
that on balance the effect will be beneficial.
(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health
or safety.
(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as
proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime
farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically
critical areas.
(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human
environment are likely to be highly controversial.
(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human
environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown
risks.
(6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for
future actions with significant effects or represents a decision in
principle about a future consideration.
(7) Whether the action is related to other actions with
individually insignificant but cumulative siginificant impacts.
Siginificance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a
cumulatively significant impact on the environment.
Significance cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary
or by breaking it down into small component parts.
(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts,
sites, highways, structures or objects listed in or eligible for
listing in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause
loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historical
resources.
(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an
endangered species or its habitat that has been determined to be
critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State,
or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the
environment.
5 See id. § 1508.27(b)(4).
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NEPA. In deference to agency decisionmaking, courts generally have
adhered to the notion that the presence of some opposition does not transform
the proposed project into being controversial." On the other hand, if the goal
of NEPA of incorporating public opinion into the decisionmaking process is
to have meaning and not simply an exercise in bureaucratic box-checking,
then the relevance of substantial opposition or criticism of a project should
play an important role in defining the significance of that project.
The difficulty lies in finding appropriate, neutral principles to
determine whether opposition amounts to a "controversy" for NEPA
purposes. Federal agencies and courts need a set of guidelines to lend
amplification to the general reference to controversy in the CEQ regulations.
Courts recently have tended to read the concept of controversy out of the
NEPA equation, thus depriving, in some measure, the public of a meaningful
voice in carrying out the statutory policy of open disclosure and input from
varied sources. 6 Although NEPA is principally a procedural statute, the
underlying theory is that full compliance with those procedures will
hopefully result in decisions which fully and fairly assess potential adverse
environmental impacts and consequently direct the decisionmaking agency
to find alternatives that lessen environmental degradation."
One of the problems left unresolved by the courts, however, in
evaluating controversy as it influences agency duties under the statute, is the
lack of clarity in delineating the nature, character, and extent of factors that
should be relevant to guide federal agencies and courts. Reliance upon
agency deference in matters of scientific debate is only partially helpful in
answering the question.
Courts have had numerous opportunities to consider whether a
particular dispute was sufficiently "controversial" to influence agency
decisionmaking under the act. The results are not uniform, but suggest that
a principled set of factors is needed to provide more consistent analysis.
Illustrative of cases where courts found the controversy insufficient to affect
agency duties include: opposition to construction grants for the
" See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1983).
" See Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 968 F.2d
1549, 1556-57 (2d Cir. 1992) (opposition from governors, senators, and local citizens not
considered "substantial"); West Houston Air Comm'n v. Federal Aviation Admin., 784 F.2d
702 (5th Cir. 1986) (over 500 persons opposing airport expansion project deemed minimal).
"' See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
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modernization and expansion of a county sewage treatment system,58
construction of a skyscraper in Manhattan,59 establishing restricted air space
over parts of a state to allow the Navy to conduct practice bombing
exercises, 6° opposition based upon aesthetic impairment of a scenic portion
of a river from construction of a barge fleeting facility,61 location of HUD
low-income housing in middle-class neighborhood in Chicago,62 a permit to
build a marina and commercial fishing piers on outer banks of North
Carolina,63 a decision of United States Fish and Wildlife Service to issue a
permit that authorized the taking of the Mission Blue butterfly from areas of
the San Bruno Mountain,' a permit for construction of a water intake
structure and pipeline presenting potential negative effect on striped bass
population of Roanoke River," construction of a hydroelectric power station
in Vermont, 66 a Forest Service salvage project to harvest timber damaged by
tornadoes, 67 a permit for the construction of a municipal landfill on wetlands
site that was allegedly the indispensable habitat of the highly endangered
Florida Panther and the threatened Eastern Indigo Snake,68 governmental
restrictions on the total allowable catch of pollock in the Gulf of Alaska,69
and an Air Force plan to install radio towers to transmit war messages in the
event of a nuclear war.70
Illustrative of cases finding a controversy included: a permit
authorizing road construction affecting the critical habitat of the Desert
5 See Town of Orangetown, 718 F.2d at 29.
9 See Landmark West! v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
60 See North Carolina v. Federal Aviation Admin., 957 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992).
6 See River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445
(7th Cir. 1985).
62 See Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975).
63 See Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
4 See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
65 See Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991).
' See Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 968 F.2d
1549 (2d Cir. 1992).
67 See Foundation for Global Sustainability v. McConnell, 829 F. Supp. 147 (W.D.N.C.
1993).
61 See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
69 See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1993).
70 See No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.
1988).
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Bighorn Sheep,71 a permit allowing Sea World to capture whales for purposes
of scientific research and public display,72 a Navy proposal to take Atlantic
bottle nose dolphins from the Gulf of Mexico and transport them for military
use to the Bangor submarine base in Puget Sound,73 issuance of a permit to
conduct scientific research on killer whales, 74 a license issued by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") permitting construction and
operation of a hydroelectric power project,75 a Department of Energy
proposed plan to ship spent nuclear fuel rods from Taiwan through a port in
Virginia,76 a permit issued for fill material to construct a bridge and jogging
path in connection with a road extension,77 Forest Service decision not to
prepare an EIS for nine timber sales of giant redwoods in the Sequoia
National Forest,78 and plans to develop an industrial park with railroad line
and marine terminal.79
Despite the considerable deference shown to agencies, though, courts
have become increasingly focused on whether the agency has met the letter
of its procedural requirements under NEPA, and have devalued the role of
countervailing public opinion as it could impact on the decisionmaking
process. Has NEPA become a "paper tiger" after all? The following section
will attempt to articulate a comprehensive framework for determining what
criteria should guide agencies and courts in meeting the twin aims of
NEPA-animating agency decisionmaking with environmental values while
engaging the public in a meaningful dialogue about the potential effects of
that project on the human environment.
This article proposes a multi-factored test that federal agencies and
reviewing courts should consider when evaluating whether opposition to a
major federal project is "highly controversial" for purposes of affecting
agency duties under NEPA: (1) the degree of opposition, both in quantitative
71 See Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172
(9th Cir. 1982).
72 See Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
71 See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Department of the Navy, 725 F. Supp. 475
(W.D. Wash. 1989).
14 See Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Evans, 688 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
7 See LaFlamme v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988).
76 See Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F. Supp. 852 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
" See Audubon Soc'y v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1992).
7 See Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988).
9 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985).
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and qualitative terms; (2) whether the disputed information is a matter of
legitimate scientific debate regarding the potential environmental impacts of
the project; (3) the stage or timing in which the disputed information is raised
and whether it would serve a useful purpose in light of decisions remaining;
(4) whether the agency has a reasoned plan of mitigation to speak to the
issues raised in opposition to the action; and (5) whether the dispute involves
a matter of objective environmental effects or an issue of a subjective nature,
such as aesthetics.
IV. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANCE IN AGENCY
DECISIONMAKING UNDER NEPA
A. Consideration of Degree of Opposition
The CEQ regulations state that one factor in assessing the significance
of a proposed project is the "degree to which the effects on the quality of the
human environment are likely to be highly controversial."8 The regulatory
limitation, couched in terms of the "degree" of opposition, is consistent with
NEPA's general framework of focusing administrative attention on the
potentially most significant environmental effects of their actions.,
The characterization of what degree of controversy satisfies the CEQ
requirement has been variously stated as being a "substantial dispute,"82
"robust dissent,"83 or of an "extraordinary nature."84 What types of actions
amount to a substantial dispute, though, is unclear. Courts have consistently
held that mere opposition to a project does not amount to being "highly
go 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (1996).
" See Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United
States Army, 916 F. Supp. 1557, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that NEPA instructs federal
agencies to perform a balancing of interests by weighing competing concerns to see whether
going forward with a project outweighs its potential adverse environmental consequences;
the most important word in the itemization of considerations regarding what is significant
is "degree"); Landmark West! v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F. Supp. 994, 1003
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (controversy is matter of degree).
82 Hanly I, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Foundation for Global Sustainability v. McConnell, 829 F. Supp. 147, 153 (W.D.N.C.
1993).
84 Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1983).
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controversial." 5 Rather, the focus ordinarily is whether a substantial dispute
exists regarding the "size, nature, or effect" of the agency action. 6
Uncertainty remains, however, in determining the quality or quantity of
opposition to a major federal action that would be sufficiently substantial to
affect agency duties under NEPA.
An early leading case interpreting the term "significantly" in the
context of section 102(2)(C) and which raised the idea that opposition or
controversy pertaining to a project could affect the nature and extent of
NEPA duties was Hanly v. Kleindienst ("Hanly II").87 The case involved a
challenge to the General Service Administration's ("GSA") determination
that the proposed construction of a nine-story federal detention center and
office building located in Manhattan did not significantly affect the quality
of the human environment and thus did not require preparation of an
environmental impact statement.88
In Hanly I,89 the court found that the GSA had relied upon an
inadequate record because it considered the effects of the building on water,
heat, sewage and garbage, yet failed to take a hard look at the environmental
impact of the jail with respect to the surrounding social fabric of the
neighborhood as well as traffic and parking problems.9" The court rendered
an expansive view of what constitutes "environmental considerations" for
NEPA purposes, stating that the scope of the Act extends beyond sewage and
garbage and includes "protection of the quality of life for city residents."'"
The court enjoined construction of the jail pending compliance by the GSA
with its procedural duties under NEPA. Following remand, the GSA
submitted an environmental assessment which considered numerous
" Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 968 F.2d 1549,
1557 (2d Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between "controversy" and "opposition" to the
project-the former potentially affecting agency duties under NEPA and the latter simply
reflecting the reality that virtually all projects have critics).
86 471 F.2d at 830. The court observed that virtually all projects will engender some
degree of criticism; therefore the term "controversial" instead should properly refer to those
situations "where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature or effect of the major
federal action rather than to the existence of opposition to a use, the effect of which is
relatively undisputed." Id.; see also Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973).
87 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
88 See id. at 826.
89 See Hanly v. Mitchell (Hanly I), 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
90 See id. at 646.
91 See id. at 647.
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environmental factors, determined that the construction of the complex was
not "significant" to justify preparation of an EIS, and concluded that the jail
should still be built.
In Hanly 11, the Second Circuit squarely addressed the issue left open
in Hanly Iregarding the proper scope and application of the "amorphous term
'significantly' within the meaning of section 102(2)(C). The court
recognized that virtually every major federal action has some adverse impact
on the human environment.92 The court articulated a two-fold inquiry into
both the "context" and "intensity" in assessing the significance of a major
federal project for defining agency duties under the statute.93
The case is also notable for the court's observations regarding the
relevance and character of public opposition in making the significance
determination. The court observed that it was understandable that some
would oppose the project because of a "psychological distaste" for having a
jail located in close proximity to residential apartments.94 Nevertheless, such
psychological and sociological effects "do not lend themselves to
measurement"95 and thus probably fall short of affecting the significance
determination by the agency. The court observed that virtually all projects
will engender some degree of criticism; therefore the term "controversial"
9 See Hanly II, 471 F.2d at 830. The court of appeals observed that "an action which is
environmentally important to one neighbor may be of no consequence to another." Id.
9 See id at 830-31. The court stated:
(1) [T]he extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental
effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the areas affected by
it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the
action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its
contribution to existing adverse conditions. or uses in the affected area.
Where conduct conforms to existing uses, its adverse consequences will
usually be less significant than when it represents a radical change.
Absent some showing that an entire neighborhood is in the process of
redevelopment, its existing environment, though frequently below an
ideal standard, represents a norm that cannot be ignored. For instance,
one more highway in an area already honeycombed with roads usually has
less of an adverse impact than if it were constructed through a roadless
public park .... One more factory polluting air and water in an area
zoned for industrial use may represent the straw that breaks the back of
the environmental camel.
Id.
9' See id. at 833.
15 See id.
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instead should properly refer to those situations "where a substantial dispute
exists as to the size, nature, or effect of the major federal action rather than
to the existence of opposition to a use, the effect of which is relatively
undisputed."96
This distinction between the nature of the controversy being directed
at "subjective" factors, such as a personal dislike of or disagreement with the
project's objectives, and "objective" emphasis on the environmental aspects
of the agency's decisionmaking process, is more fully discussed in Part IV
of this article. In the former instance, considerable deference is given to
agency decisionmaking, principally on the basis that unanimity of opinion is
impossible and subjective tastes differ. In the latter, especially where the
character of the dissent has an objective scientific basis, reviewing courts
have been more inclined to evaluate whether the agency has a reasoned
explanation for its decision to dismiss the controversy. The Hanly II court's
emphasis on the degree of opposition corresponds to and reflects NEPA's
structure and priority for agency duties increasing as the project is deemed to
present a significant impact to the quality of the human environment.
Opposition, in order to be cognizable under NEPA, must focus on the
anticipated environmental effects, not merely the government's decision to
go forward with the project.97 For instance, in Town of Orangetown v.
Gorsuch,98 the Town challenged the approval by the EPA of construction
grants for the modernization and expansion of a county sewage treatment
system. The town claimed that the EPA erred in its determination that the
system would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment,
pointing to strong local opposition to the project. 99
The court acknowledged that the expansion of an unpopular sewage
treatment plant would be expected to generate considerable opposition.
However, in order to affect an agency's duties under NEPA, the nature of the
opposition must be of an "extraordinary" character, not merely speculation
that the plant expansion will increase odor problems. 1 0 The court stated that
96 Id. at 830. The court observed: "Experience in local zoning disputes demonstrates that
it is the rare case where some neighbors do not oppose a project, no matter how beneficial,
and that their opposition is usually accompanied by threats of litigation." Id. at 830 n.9A.
9' See Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973).
98 718 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983).
9' See id. at 31.
'0 See id. at 39.
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"opposition and a high degree of controversy.., are not synonymous.''
Further, the prospect of litigation did not transform a project into being
significant for NEPA purposes; otherwise someone could always affect the
government process merely by threatening litigation.102
At what point does the sheer quantity of opposition constitute a
sufficient degree of controversy to affect agency decisionmaking duties under
NEPA? This was explored in West Houston Air Commission v. Federal
Aviation Administration,13 where the FAA issued a certificate which
authorized an airport to serve larger passenger flights. The FAA's own
regulations interpreting NEPA provide that an EA should not be prepared
before a Part 139 certificate is issued unless the proposed action is "highly
controversial on environmental grounds. 10 4
The court dismissed the opposition as insubstantial, although the FAA
had received 558 signatures on petitions, representing some 396 households,
and about 120 letters opposing the airport expansion.10 5 The court reasoned
that the actual number of people who objected was not large in relation to the
population who would be affected by the certification.0 6 Thus, the public
opposition was seen as "minimal" in relation to the relevant project service
area, and not of such an "extraordinary nature" to warrant a modification of
the agency's responsibilities under NEPA.107
NEPA contemplates that the nature and extent of the impact statement
process turns in part on the "significance" of the proposed project. Should
"01 Id. See also Foundation for Global Sustainability v. McConnell, 829 F. Supp. 147, 153
(W.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that objections by several groups to Forest Service decision for
salvage project to harvest timber damaged by tornadoes are not robust enough dissent to
affect agency decisionmaking responsibilities).
102 See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1983).
103 784 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1986).
"o Id. at 704. The applicable regulation provided that a project was considered highly
controversial when "opposed by a Federal, state or local government agency or by a
substantial number of the persons affected by such action on environmental grounds." Id.
105 See id. at 705. Compare Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986), where
approximately 1,000 comments were received both voicing support and opposition to an
application for a permit authorizing Sea World to capture killer whales for scientific research
and display. The court held that the agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation of its
decisions rather than a conclusory statement that the impacts were "not significant." Id. at
828.
106 West Houston Air Comm 'n, 784 F.2d at 705.
107 See id.
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a negative inference be drawn, for example of "insignificance," where public
opposition may be limited? In an early case under NEPA, Mahelona v.
Hawaiian Electric Co.,"°8 that question was addressed by the court in a suit
brought by surfing groups seeking to enjoin an electric utility and
governmental plan to construct a discharge facility at a site affecting surfers.
Although opposition to the agency action was limited, the court observed that
the lack of adverse public response regarding the permit application for the
discharge facility did not necessarily render the project "insignificant" for
NEPA purposes."'
Implicit in the court's analysis is recognition that expression of public
concern or lack thereof is just one of many factors regarding whether or not
an EIS is justified. The court indicated that it is preferable to place a burden
upon the agency rather than "risk the substantial and often irreversible
environmental and financial consequences which may result from a short-
sighted and narrow approach" by the agency with respect to NEPA
responsibilities."'
B. Debate Within the Scientific Community
Controversy within the scientific community has played an influential
role in the assessment of whether a proposed project is considered
"significant" for NEPA purposes. Scientific debates have taken various
forms, including disputes over proper scientific methodologies to obtain data
pertaining to a proposed project, the reliability of data generated, the
interpretation of data, the relationship of environmental impacts within and
beyond an affected ecosystem, and the advisability of pursuing a particular
course of action in light of other available alternatives. Because the scientific
community seldom speaks with unanimity, "controversy" is the norm, not the
10' 418 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Haw. 1976).
109 See id. at 1333-34. The court observed: "[W]here the Corps knows that a project will
seriously interfere with an important existing activity in an area, it may not place reliance
on the silence of relatively unorganized and ill-informed citizens in determining the
environmental impact of a proposed project." Id. at 1333.
110 Id.
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exception. "
Some projects that implicate NEPA may raise a host of environmental
impact issues which are not readily calculable because of the uncertainties of
science. In matters on the "frontiers of science," courts have been the "most
deferential" to agency decisions.112 In evaluating factual disputes over highly
technical matters, courts routinely defer to the informed decision of the
responsible federal agency, provided that it has a reasoned basis of support.113
The Supreme Court has supported the discretion of federal agencies to rely
upon the reasoned opinions of its own qualified experts for purposes of
NEPA compliance where specialists have expressed differing views on a
particular matter, even if a reviewing court might consider other opinions
more persuasive.' 14
... See Foundation for Global Sustainability v. McConnell, 829 F. Supp. 147, 153
(W.D.N.C. 1993); see also Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F. Supp. 852, 860 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (stating that no case has answered the "difficult question of how many experts must
dispute an agency's findings before it becomes 'controversial"').
112 When an agency is "making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the
frontiers of science," and the court is examining its scientific determinations, rather than
otherwise simple factual findings, "a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential." Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
"' See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); Committee to Preserve Boomer
Lake Park v. Department of Transp., 4 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1993). "[D]isagreement among
experts or in the methodologies employed is generally not sufficient to invalidate an
environmental assessment. Courts are not in a position to decide the propriety of competing
methodologies" in matters of special environmental expertise charged to the agency; rather
the nature of inquiry is whether the agency had a rational basis and took into consideration
the relevant factors. Id. at 1553 (citations omitted); see also Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F.
Supp. 852, 868 (D.D.C. 1991) (issuing an injunction where the DOE failed to comply
consistently with its own scientific methodology by not assessing certain low probability
risks associated with shipping spent nuclear fuel rods from Taiwan through a port in
Virginia, until the agency appropriately discussed the full range of risk factors involved in
the transportation of the spent nuclear fuel). Id. at 877.
"4 In Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, the Court observed:
When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have
discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts
even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more
persuasive. On the other hand, in the context of reviewing a decision not
to supplement an EIS, courts should not automatically defer to the
agency's express reliance on an interest in finality without carefully
reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made
a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the significance-or lack
1997]
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The framework of NEPA itself compounds the difficulty of evaluating
diverse scientific judgments regarding an agency proposal. Because the
principal focus of the statute is mandating procedural compliance, substantive
adverse environmental effects associated with a project are subordinated to
the procedural mission. Nevertheless, in complying procedurally, the agency
will hopefully obtain feedback from other agencies, the scientific community,
and interested members of the general public. An agency may gain useful
insights from such information, and thus may decide to modify the project or
select a particular alternative course of action. However, an agency is not
required to discuss every scientific viewpoint or to give weight to any
particular theory. Courts should not dismiss every scientific debate
surrounding a project and automatically defer to the federal agency's own
scientific methods. Rather, what is needed is an approach that reconciles the
competing policies of deference to agency expertise while also fairly
considering relevant scientific information as it may influence the
decisionmaking process.
The leading case for determination by a federal court that an agency
insufficiently considered the relevance of scientific "controversy" in the
NEPA decisionmaking process is Foundation for North American Wild
Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture,"5 (hereinafter "Wild
Sheep"). In that case, several environmental interest organizations
challenged the United States Forest Service's decision not to prepare an
environmental impact statement prior to granting a special use permit
allowing a mining company to reconstruct and use a road across federally
controlled forest lands." 6 The company owned and operated a tungsten mine
in the San Gabriel Mountains in the Angeles National Forest and wanted to
increase its access to its mining operations by reopening the road." 7 The
only other available road access frequently flooded, thus causing substantial
"down time" and precluding economical operation of the mine. The proposal
involved clearing the road of vegetation, widening the road and repairing
of significance-of the new information. A contrary approach would not
simply render judicial review generally meaningless, but would be
contrary to the demand that courts ensure that agency decisions are
founded on a reasoned evaluation "of the relevant factors."
490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
"t5 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982).
116 See id. at 1174.
117 See id.
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certain portions that had been washed out.' 18
The road construction proposal was opposed by various
environmentalist organizations (collectively the "Foundation"), biologists,
the California State Department of Natural Resources, and the California
State Department of Fish and Game, principally on the basis that the road
construction would negatively impact the habitat and ecosystem of one of the
remaining herds of Desert Bighorn Sheep." 9 California law considered the
Bighorn Sheep a "protected" species of wildlife and prohibited sport hunting;
federal law classified the Bighorn as a "sensitive" species which received
certain special management protections. 2 ' The Foundation relied upon
scientific evidence which indicated that the Bighorn was particularly
sensitive to environmental changes and susceptible to "stress-related"
diseases resulting from interaction with other species. 2 '
The Forest Service responded to the various concerns in an
environmental assessment, and considered a range of alternative courses of
action with differing types of projected effects on the Bighorn herd. The
agency determined that the alternative which provided for limited usage and
closure during the several months of lambing season should be adopted.' 2
The agency further determined that no environmental impact statement was
necessary because the alternative would adequately mitigate the potential
harm to the Bighorn herd and thus would not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment.'23
The Foundation sought injunctive relief to halt the reopening of the
road until the agency prepared an EIS. "4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Forest Service failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental
consequences of its decision, and the agency's determination that reopening
the road would not pose significant environmental consequences was
unreasonable. 25 The court found the EA inadequate because it failed to
include an estimate of projected truck traffic on the road and the potential
..8 See id. at 1175.
19 See id.
120 See id.
12! See id. at 1175-76.
22 See id. at 1176.
123 See id.
124 See id.
,25 See id. at 1182.
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effect on the Bighorn herd. 26 The court observed that "controversial" for
purposes of assessing significance of proposed agency action had reference
to those situations 'where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature,
or effect of the major federal action rather than to the existence of opposition
to a use.""
'127
The court focused on the widespread criticism of the Forest Service's
proposed action by numerous conservationist environmental organizations,
state agencies, and biologists with specialized knowledge of the Bighorn
sheep in challenging the agency's scientific assumptions and conclusions that
the project would not have a significant detrimental impact on the herd. 128
The court reasoned that such scientific debate going to an important matter
constituted the sort of "controversy" that would justify preparation of an EIS
for more in-depth study and evaluation of alternative courses of action. 1
9
The court accordingly reversed and remanded, finding that the agency action
was unreasonable. 30
Several years after the Wild Sheep decision, the Ninth Circuit again
addressed the issue of public controversy in the NEPA decisionmaking
process in Jones v. Gordon.'3' The National Marine Fisheries Service issued
a permit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act authorizing Sea World to
capture killer whales for purposes of scientific research and public display.
The permit contemplated that up to 100 whales could be collected over a five
year period from California and Alaska coastal waters, ten of which could be
maintained permanently in captivity for research and display and the
remainder temporarily studied and released. 32
The permit sparked a tremendous outpouring of public opinion as
over 1,200 comments supported the application and 1,000 comments voiced
126 See id. at 1178.
127 Id. at 1182 (quoting Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973)).
128 See id. at 1181-82.
129 See id. at 1182; see also Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Department of the Navy,
725 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (holding that Navy plans to take Atlantic bottle nose
dolphins from the Gulf of Mexico and transport them to the Bangor submarine base in Puget
Sound, Maine, for military use, pursuant to Marine Mammal Protection Act violated NEPA
where the navy failed to prepare EA or EIS, and finding that the "reverse impact" on the
dolphins was subject to scrutiny under NEPA as "highly controversial").
130 See Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1181-82.
.31 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
132 See id. at 823.
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opposition in whole or in part.1 3 3 The public comments criticized the
agency's scientific conclusions on various grounds, including arguments that
killer whales in captivity cannot perform their ecological role, that whales do
not survive long once in captivity, and that exploitation would present a long-
term harm to both population size and social structure of the species. 13 4
Further, they argued that the permit would undercut the United States'
position against whaling.'35 The Service's own final report on the application
by Sea World for the permit to capture the whales acknowledged the
existence of "public controversy based on environmental consequences."' 36
The Service disputed some of the scientific evidence offered by
opponents of the permit, but did not explain why they were insufficient to
create a public controversy based on environmental consequences.' 37 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's judgment
that the decision by the agency not to prepare an environmental impact
statement was deficient and unreasonable because it failed to explain why the
permit did not fall within an exception to its own categorical exclusions
pertaining to public controversy. 3 The court held that the agency must
provide reasoned explanations of its decisions rather than conclusory
statements of "no significance."' 39
133 See id.
134 See id. at 828.
131 See id. at 829.
136 See id. at 828.
131 See id. at 828-29.
131 See id. at 829.
139 See id. at 828; see also Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. &Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 741 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that an agency cannot avoid
responsibilities under NEPA merely by asserting that an activity won't have a significant
effect; the responsible federal agency must supply convincing statement of reasons why
potential effects are insignificant); Public Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Andrus, 825 F. Supp.
1483, 1496 (D. Idaho 1993) (not accepting the conclusory statements of no significant
effects in an environmental assessment where those statements form the basis for the EA and
are either clearly inadequate or a bad faith analysis of expected environmental
consequences).
In a similar vein, in Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Evans, 688 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Wash.1987), an environmental organization challenged issuance of a permit to conduct scientific
research on killer whales in Puget Sound. See id. at 580. The permit authorized theharassment of the killer whales and the collection, by dart biopsy, of skin and tissue samples
to study contamination and diet and pod integrity. See id. The government claimed that the
activity fell within a categorical exclusion under NEPA and thus did not necessitate
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Interestingly, although the number of public comments criticizing the
agency action exceeded 1,000, the court did not specifically rely on that to
conclude that the project was "highly controversial." Rather, the court
focused on the fact that the agency had not articulated a reasoned explanation
of its decision to issue the permit in light of the scientific uncertainty
surrounding the impact of the proposal on the whales. Presumably, the sheer
quantity of the criticism lent credence to the scientific debate, but was not
articulated as an independent factor to constitute a controversy.
Another influential decision regarding the issue of scientific
controversy was Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service,4 ° which
involved a challenge to the Forest Service's decision not to prepare an EIS
for nine timber sales of giant redwoods in the Sequoia National Forest. The
agency concluded that the logging would not significantly affect the quality
of the human environment, although five of the affected tracts contained
groves of giant sequoia redwoods that are known for their size and
longevity. 4'
The Sierra Club produced affidavits and testimony of
conservationists, biologists, and other scientific experts who criticized the
preparation of an EIS. See id. at 581.
The National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") published a summary of the
project and requested public comments. See id. at 580. In response, two comments
supported the project and ten strongly voiced opposition. Also, another federal agency and
the Regional Director of the NMFS itself expressed serious environmental concerns about
the project. See id. The concerns included questions regarding the validity of the scientific
techniques relied upon by the agency, possible long term alteration of the killer whale's
social behavior as a result of the harassment, and the potential that it would negatively
impact the ability of other researchers to collect data by causing whales to avoid the area.
See id. at 581.
The court agreed that the NMFS study was "controversial," pointing to those
factors as well as the number of organizations and individuals opposing issuance of the
permit. See id. at 583. Additionally, the court considered the government's failure to
explain why the effects of the study would not be controversial, and the government
effectively or implicitly agreed that the project was scientifically controversial by attaching
various limitations and restrictions to the permit (e.g., observers, limit number, suspend
research if indication that harm to previously healthy whale). See id. at 581. In sum, the
court found that once legitimate scientific controversy raises credible points of disagreement
over method or analysis, the agency cannot merely dismiss such opposing views without
providing adequate support in the administrative record. See id. at 585-86.
140 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988).
' See id. at 1192.
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EA's and disagreed with the Forest Service's conclusions that the logging
operations would not pose a serious threat to the sequoias.'42 They contended
that the agency should have erred on the side of conservation and careful
evaluation of the ecological balance because of "uncertainties" regarding the
groves of giant sequoias, and because sequoias are viewed as "priceless"
natural resources that can be devastated by a disruption of the existing
ecological balance. 143
Two factors joined to influence the court's decision that the agency
had failed to properly assess the significance of the public controversy
regarding the logging proposal. First, the nature of the resource potentially
affected are characterized as "priceless." Second, scientific uncertainties
existed as to the effects of a disruption of the ecosystem on the giant
sequoias. The Sierra Club contended that the agency should have erred on
the side of conservation based upon these two factors.'44 The court agreed
with the Sierra Club and concluded that to ignore such public input would
render section 1508.27(b)(4) of NEPA a "nullity.' 1 45 Consequently, the court
enjoined the timber sales, finding that the agency decision was not fully
informed and well considered. 146
A recent illustration of the role of controversy as affecting the
determination of "significance" in agency decisionmaking under NEPA is
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin.147 In Greenpeace Action, an environmental
activist organization alleged violations of NEPA and the Endangered Species
Act, 148 by the Secretary of Commerce and the National Marine Fisheries
Service in establishing a total allowable catch of pollock in the Gulf of
Alaska without preparation of an EIS. The plaintiffs contended that the
agency policy regarding the pollock would prove excessively harmful to the
Steller sea lion population, classified as a "threatened" species under the
ESA.149 The plaintiffs claimed that the pollock was a staple in the diet of the
Steller sea lion and that excessive harvesting of pollock would cause a
142 See id. at 1193-94.
141 See id. at 1194.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 1195; see also Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 1982).
146 See Sierra Club, 843 F.2d at 1195.
147 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1993).
148 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
149 See 14 F.3d at 1327.
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decline in the sea lion population. 5 ' The group claimed that various
scientific studies, including the Service's own data, linked the harvesting of
pollock as the "leading factor" in the decline of the sea lion population. 5'
The Service disagreed, relying on two environmental assessments which
analyzed the projected effect of the harvesting policy, but which concluded
that it did not correspond to a reduction in the sea lion population.
5 2
The court upheld the Service's decision not to prepare an EIS, finding
that its conclusions were based on substantial scientific data, not
speculation.'53 Thus, even though the Service's scientific data was not
dispositive and a dispute existed pertaining to its management measures, that
did not equate to a "controversy" for NEPA purposes.'54 The court flatly
rejected the notion that a controversy exists for NEPA purposes whenever
qualified experts disagree; otherwise the EA process would be rendered
meaningless.'55 The court reasoned that, if a scientific dispute alone led to a
determination that an agency had acted arbitrarily or capriciously, they
"could only act upon achieving a degree of certainty that is ultimately
illusory." '156
The court accorded a greater degree of deference to the agency
because it was a fact-based challenge to the agency determination not to
prepare an initial EIS.' The court also found that an environmental
controversy cannot be established "post hoc" by critics of a proposal simply
presenting the differing views of their own experts when at the time of the
"So See id.
151 Id.
2 See id. at 1327-1328.
113 See id. at 1332-36.
154 See id. at 1333.
155 See id. at 1335.
156 Id. at 1336. The court observed:
If this type of disagreement were all that was necessary to mandate an
EIS, the environmental assessment process would be meaningless. An
agency's careful evaluation of the impact of its propose action, its
collection and review of evidence, and its reasoned conclusions as to what
the data reveals would be for not if by simply filing suit and supplying an
affidavit by a hired expert, predicated upon the same facts relied upon the
same facts relied upon by the agency but reaching a different conclusion,
a litigant could create a controversy necessitating an EIS.
Id. at 1335.
17 See id. at 1331.
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agency action there was no dispute. 158
The court distinguished the situation in Greenpeace Action from that
in Wild Sheep in that the Service had considered crucial factors and had
established a virtual consensus, even among objecting parties, that its
management measures, as revised, were adequate to preserve the Sea Lion
food supply. '15 9
A recent illustration of the role of controversy as affecting the
determination of "significance" in agency decisionmaking under NEPA is
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice. 60 In that case, an environmental group
sought to prevent construction of a municipal landfill on a wetlands site that
was allegedly an indispensable habitat of the highly endangered Florida
Panther and the threatened Eastern Indigo Snake.' The Corps of Engineers
had issued a Clean Water Act permit for construction of the landfill under
section 404 and Nationwide Permit No. 26.162 The Corps had determined that
a public hearing would not benefit the decisionmaking process. 163
The court found that the agency had satisfied its obligations of taking
a "hard look" at the permitting decision under NEPA in that it had considered
two separate "no jeopardy" Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinions
regarding the panther and snake, extensive information provided by
plaintiff's experts, as well as information gained through two public hearings
held by the state.'" Further, the EPA had also given its approval to the
project. Thus, despite the presence of criticism of the permitting decision
claiming that the project would potentially impact negatively on the habitat
of the species, the nature and extent of the opposition did not constitute the
degree of "controversy" sufficient to trigger a duty on the part of the agency
to prepare an environmental impact statement. 165
This case reaffirms the historic approach taken by many courts:
where there is a dispute among credible scientists, the federal agency will
have discretion to make a reasoned choice in determining which scientific
methodology to follow in compliance with NEPA. Further, the agency
158 Id. at 1334.
' See id. at 1333-34.
160 85 F.3d 535 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
161 See id. at 538.
162 See id. at 539.
163 See id.
64 See id. at 546.
165 See id.
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simply cannot conclude that the proposal poses no significant impact, rather,
it must provide sufficient support for that determination. Provided the
agency has discharged its procedural duties, however, the agency is not
bound by NEPA to select a particular course of action, notwithstanding
scientific opposition or whether a reviewing court would have preferred an
alternative plan. Interestingly, one of the problems left unresolved by the
courts, in evaluating "controversy" as it influences agency duties under the
statute, is the lack of clarity in delineating the nature, character, and extent
of factors that should be relevant to guide agencies and courts. Reliance upon
agency deference in matters of scientific debate is only partially helpful in
answering the question.
C. Timing and Usefulness of Purpose
In its policy statements, NEPA establishes a "philosophical"
orientation in its wide-sweeping consideration of the environmental values
and the relationship of people with the environment. 6 6 Yet the mechanism
by which its philosophy is implemented is exceedingly pragmatic. The EIS
process reflects a prioritization of agency resources to focus on those
environmental effects deemed "significant."' 67  One key aspect of
significance turns on the degree to which the project is considered "highly
controversial.' ' 68 That inquiry itself may be interpreted according to whether
opposition to a major federal project generates information which, if more
fully taken into account by the lead agency, would serve a useful purpose in
light of the decisionmaking process. 69
NEPA's policy of active public involvement and participation must
be balanced against the policy of allowing an agency to make reasoned
decisions in an expeditious manner. This balance is necessary to avoid
excessive costs and delays in the administrative process. The nature of
governmental decisionmaking contemplates the progressive development of
166 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). The purpose of NEPA is to "declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment." Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1996). "Human environment" is
interpreted "comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the
relationship of people with that environment." Id.
167 40 C.F.R. § 1500.
168 Id. § 1508.27(b)(4).
169 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
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facts and consequent analysis in different stages, each with functional
differences. Thus, controversy cannot be established post hoc; rather, the
disputed material must be raised in a timely fashion to facilitate incorporation
into the federal agency's study and analysis. 7 ' In determining whether a
particular dispute is considered "highly controversial" for purposes of
affecting agency decisionmaking duties, a court should evaluate the stage of
the process in which the information is raised and the value to the ongoing
duties remaining by the agency. There are several dimensions to this inquiry:
(1) will the information serve a useful purpose in light of the remaining
decisions; (2) are the goals of NEPA advanced regarding meaningful public
involvement and fully developed information available to the governmental
agency; (3) what is the nature of the controversy in light of purpose and goals
of the proposed project; and (4) at what stage of administrative proceedings
was the disputed information raised, and have other groups had an
opportunity to raise the same issue at an earlier time?
Evaluating agency compliance under NEPA must be done by
reference to the statutory policy of considering environmental values "to the
fullest extent possible."'' As recognized by Judge Skelly Wright in Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission, 172 Congress did not intend for NEPA to become a "paper
tiger."' 173 Instead, its procedural requirements set a high standard for federal
agencies which would be "rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts."'1 74
Other courts have recognized that NEPA's action-forcing mandate reflects
more than an "environmental full-disclosure."' 75  Instead, the Act was
170 See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1993). The
purpose of NEPA is further explained in 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b): "NEPA procedures must
insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before
decisions are made and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality.
Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to
implementing NEPA." Id.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
112 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"' See id. at 1114
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army,
470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972). The court observed: "The unequivocal intent of NEPA
is to require agencies to consider and give effect to the environmental goals set forth in the
Act, not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill government archives." Id. at 298.
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"intended to effect substantive changes in decisionmaking,"' 176 recognizing
that a certain degree of institutional bias exists within a governmental
agency. 1
77
The pragmatic dimension of the respective roles of the agency and the
public as role-players in the NEPA process was highlighted in River Road
Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army.'78 The case
involved opposition to a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers for
a temporary barge fleeting facility on the Mississippi River. The principal
objection was that the Corps failed to adequately consider the detriment to
the aesthetics of the area if the barge facility were constructed. 79
Judge Posner noted the practical concern of cost in preparation of a
full-scale EIS, observing that government activity would "pretty much grind
to a halt" if every federal action necessitated preparation of a full scale
environmental impact statement. 8 ° A critical question in the analysis of the
significance of information pertaining to the project, then, was whether the
consequences were potentially serious enough to justify the attendant time
delays and expense. The court observed:
The statutory concept of "significant" impact has no
determinate meaning, and to interpret it sensibly in particular
cases requires a comparison that is also a prediction: whether
the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact
statement are commensurate with the likely benefits from a
more searching evaluation than an environmental assessment
provides. ''
Judge Posner also recognized a historical shift in emphasis from the
Hanly II era of the early 1970s where preparation of an environmental impact
statement was less burdensome, to the increasing complexity and associated
176 Id. at 297.
' See id. at 295; see also Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (lst Cir. 1983)
(holding that each government decision "represents a link in a chain of bureaucratic
commitment that will become progressively harder to undo the longer it continues").
1 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
179 See id.
IsO See id. at 449.
181 Id.
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costs in preparing environmental assessments.1 2 As a consequence of that
change, Judge Posner observed that there had been a corresponding
"loosening of the judicial reins on agency decisions not to require
environmental impact statements."' 83 Posner suggests that "today, for good
or ill, environmental assessments are thorough enough to permit a higher
threshold for requiring environmental impact statements."'' 8 4 With respect
to evaluating the nature and extent of public opposition in light of its
significance for NEPA purposes, Judge Posner stated that to allow the
presence of criticism to "tip the balance" toward requiring preparation of an
EIS would be tantamount to allowing a "heckler's veto" in First Amendment
law. 85
The utility of the information generated in a public controversy also
played a key role in No GWENAlliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge,"6
involving a plan by the Air Force to install numerous 300 foot radio towers
that would be components in the Ground Wave Emergency Network
("GWEN"). The purpose of the GWEN system is to send war messages to
United States strategic forces during and after a nuclear war by the utilization
of low frequency radio waves between sensor installations, command posts,
and land based nuclear forces.'87 The network is designed to withstand the
electromagnetic pulse generated by atmospheric nuclear detonations.8 8 The
Air Force issued a generic EA for the entire project and site specific EA's for
each proposed tower location.1 9
The group challenging the action claimed that the documents should
also consider the environmental impacts of nuclear war. 90 Essentially, they
argued that the GWEN system is destabilizing, makes nuclear war more
probable and potentially more severe, and increases the likelihood that an
area with a GWEN tower would be a priority target.' 9' The court rejected the
plaintiff's contentions, reasoning that it would not serve a useful purpose for
182 Id. at 450-51.
"I Id. at 450.
114 Id. at 451.
185 See id.
186 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the Air Force to speculate on the potential devastation associated with a
nuclear war.' 92
The NEPA process also contemplates circulation of federal proposals
among other agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities and expertise in the
relevant field. The comments received by such agencies may influence the
decisionmaking by the lead agency but are not entitled to deference nor
dictate a particular result.' 93 The nature and extent of the disagreement,
though, may affect whether the proposal is considered "highly
controversial,"' 94 and thus whether an EIS must be prepared.
For example, in Foundation for Global Sustainability v.
McConnell,95 there was disagreement within the Forest Service regarding
the propriety of a decision to conduct a salvage operation to harvest timber
damaged by tornadoes. The court noted that disagreement within an agency
may evidence controversy but that NEPA does not require unanimity of
192 See id. at 1387. The court observed:
While the precise effects of a nuclear exchange may be "controversial,"
"uncertain," "unique," and "unknown," everyone recognizes that these
effects would be catastrophic .... [D]etailing these results would serve
no useful purpose. The NEPA requirement that the agency activity be
causally related to an environmental impact is not overcome simply
because the exact effect of the project is, for example, controversial or
unique.
Id.
193 See Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department of Transp., 4 F.3d 1543,
1553 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that disagreement among experts or in methodologies
employed is generally not sufficient to invalidate an EA); Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt,
918 F. Supp. 879, 899 (D.V.I. 1996) (finding that disagreement over the potential effect on
the Virgin Islands Tree Boa, an endangered species, of proposed project to construct
temporary emergency housing for residents displaced by the devastation caused to St.
Thomas by Hurricane Marilyn, viewed insufficient to require EIS).
1" See Roanoke River Basin Assoc. v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58, 64 (4th Cir. 1991). See also
Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Andrus, 825 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (D. Idaho 1993) (holding that
one of the key factors in evaluating significance of DOE's proposal involving shipment,
receipt processing, and storage of nuclear spent fuel at national engineering laboratory in
Idaho, was that agency's own independent contractor expressed "grave reservations" about
the scope and the adequacy of EA and finding of no significant impact); Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985) (asserting that an influential factor in finding
significance of project to build industrial park and marine terminal was disagreement among
several federal environmental agencies).
"' 829 F. Supp. 147 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
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opinion. 196 Further, the court reasoned that debate and dissension could serve
a useful purpose by fleshing out the issues regarding government
proposals. 197 To require a full-blown EIS simply because of a disagreement
among governmental units would be counterproductive to NEPA's policy of
generating healthy discussion.198
Similarly, in Roanoke River Basin Association v. Hudson, 9 9 the State
of North Carolina and the Roanoke River Basin Authority appealed a
decision by Army Corps of Engineers to issue a permit to the City of Virginia
Beach to construct a water intake structure and pipeline. Several state and
federal agencies contended that the effect on the striped bass population in
the Roanoke River was sufficiently uncertain that an EIS should be
conducted.2"' The Corps itself had recognized that the pipeline was
controversial because of the substantial volume of water removed from the
river basin, but concluded that the controversy had been eliminated by its
mitigation plan."0' The court upheld the agency decision, finding that the
disagreement among government agencies did not constitute a sufficient
controversy to necessitate the preparation of an EIS.2°2 Rather, the Corps
properly should consider the comments of other agencies, but was not bound
to defer to them, only to address the comments and provide a reasoned
explanation why it found them unpersuasive.2 °3
The administrative process under NEPA blends mandated procedural
steps to ensure full consideration of environmental values by all federal
agencies undertaking major projects with significant environmental effects.
Such requirements, although not directed to achieve a particular outcome, are
intended to ensure the integrity of the process and hopefully achieve better
decisionmaking. Timing issues play an important role in the procedural
mechanism, as the value of information declines to the extent that it is
presented later in the process. The utility of controversial ideas is a relevant
196 See id. at 153.
1 See id.
198 See id. The court stated, "Such a result would be directly opposed to the Congressional
desire to have these issues debated, which is the precise reason for requiring agencies to
solicit public comment on a proposed action." Id. at 154.
199 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991).
200 See id. at 62.
20' See id. at 62-63.
202 See id. at 64.
203 See id.
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consideration in assessing whether an agency should undertake further or
different steps under the statute. Utility, though, is not an end in itself but
rather a component in the overall assessment of whether a proposal is
significant and thus merits a closer look by the lead agency.
D. Mitigation Measures as Affecting Determination of Significance
NEPA contemplates that federal agencies incorporate consideration
of potential mitigation measures in various stages as part of their
decisionmaking process. 2°4  The CEQ regulations provide for various
instances in which an agency should consider mitigation measures in the
process of its decisionmaking. Mitigation plays a role in the scope of the
EIS,2 °5 in the alternatives to the proposed action,2 °6 the consequences to that
action,20 7 and finally in the explanation of the decision rendered.20 8
In keeping with the philosophy that NEPA duties are essentially
procedural, courts have not mandated that an agency actually adopt a
particular mitigation plan as a substantive requirement.20 9 In evaluating the
significance of a proposal for purposes of assessing whether an EIS must be
prepared, however, one relevant factor is whether the agency contemplates
undertaking mitigation steps to ameliorate the adverse environmental impacts
204 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1996). "Mitigation" includes:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts
of an action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude or the action
and its implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the
affected environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and
maintenance operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute
resources or environments.
205 See id. § 1508.25(b).
206 See id. § 1502.14(f).
207 See id. § 1502.16(h).
208 See id. § 1505.2(c).
209 See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989).
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of the project, including those aspects deemed "controversial."21 Thus,
although a major federal action may be projected to present "significant"
environmental effects, an agency may also contemplate adoption of various
mitigation measures that would collectively lessen such impacts to the degree
that the project would no longer be considered significant. If so, an agency
may not be required to prepare an EIS because the mitigation measures would
sufficiently reduce or eliminate the adverse impacts. Mitigation issues also
can arise in the context of reviewing the sufficiency of agency evaluation in
a full-blown environmental impact statement as well.21'
Consideration of projected mitigation measures as part of the
"significance" calculus may present problems, however, where the
definiteness or certainty of the future commitment to undertake such steps is
unclear. The concerns by a reviewing court pertaining to whether mitigation
measures in fact will be implemented by the agency are alleviated where a
statute or regulation mandates such actions, or where a formal undertaking
or contractual commitment is made by the agency or by a third party.
Otherwise, generalized references to mitigation measures without some
commitment or obligation by the agency have drawn criticism as eviscerating
the agency's duties under NEPA.212 The balance between formalized
undertakings to implement mitigation measures as compared to generalized
non-binding plans for mitigation 23 has presented a fertile ground for
challenge to agency action.
In Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears
v. Peterson,214 the Forest Service approved plans for exploratory mineral
drilling in a wilderness area in Montana despite the potential for impacting
210 See Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
487 F.2d 1029, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a modification of the project design to
ameliorate various adverse environmental effects, such as potential damage to river ecology,
could obviate duty to prepare EIS).
211 See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 332.
212 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1994).
[T]here always has been something suspiciously circular about the
practice of mitigated FONSIs: the agencies contend with conviction that
they don't have to write EISs to consider all the bad things that might
happen because they already have given careful thought to, and taken
precautions against, all the bad things that might happen.
Id. at 893-94.
213 See Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982).
214 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the habitat of grizzly bears, a threatened species under the Endangered
Species Act. The Service incorporated a variety of mitigation conditions in
its environmental assessment, including restrictions on overnight camping,
limiting helicopter flights, reclamation of drilling sites, seasonal restrictions
on drilling activity, and monitoring of the drilling by agency personnel.215
Appellants, in reliance upon CEQ guidance,216 contended that the
mitigation measures could not be used to justify the Forest Service's failure
to prepare an EIS because they were not included in the original agency
proposal nor mandated by statute or regulation. The court acknowledged that
ordinarily CEQ interpretations were entitled to substantial deference;
however, the particular guidance at issue was merely an informal statement
not of a regulatory character. 217 The court upheld the Service's reliance on
the mitigation measures as justifying its decision not to prepare an
environmental impact statement even though the plans were developed
subsequent to the original proposal and were not imposed by statute or
regulation.21 8 The court observed that NEPA's threshold of what constitutes
a "significant effect" is not reached when the agency includes mitigation
measures that "compensate completely" for adverse effects of the proposal.21 9
215 See id. at 680.
216 See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,038 (1981). The CEQ had taken a position that
mitigation measures should influence agency decisionmaking only in narrow circumstances:
Mitigation measures may be relied upon to make a finding of no
significant impact only if they are imposed by statute or regulation, or
submitted by an applicant or agency as part of the original proposal. As
a general rule, the regulations contemplate that agencies should use a
broad approach in defining significance and should not rely on the
possibility of mitigation as an excuse to avoid the EIS requirement.
Id.
217 See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682.
218 See id. at 682-83.
219 Id. The court stated:
Logic also supports this result. NEPA's EIS requirement is governed by
the rule of reason, and an EIS must be prepared only when significant
environmental impacts will occur as a result of the proposed action. If,
however, the proposal is modified prior to implementation by adding
specific mitigation measures which completely compensate for any
possible adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original
proposal, the statutory threshold of significant environmental effects is not
crossed and an EIS is not required. To require an EIS in such
214 [Vol.21:175
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The court concluded that the agency action properly considered the
mitigation measures and that its determination that an EIS was not required
was not "arbitrary or capricious. 22 °
However, mitigation measures contemplated by an agency at an early
stage in the administrative process, such as in the context of an environmental
assessment, do not necessarily have to "completely eliminate" the
controversy in order to render a project "insignificant" for EIS purposes. For
example, in Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen,22' the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service decided to issue a permit that authorized the
taking of an endangered species, the Mission Blue butterfly, in connection
with plans for an extensive commercial and residential development. The
Service issued a FONSI based upon a Biological Opinion which concluded
that the planned development under the permit would not jeopardize the
continued existence of the butterfly under the Endangered Species Act.
The court recognized that mitigation measures may be considered in
determining whether a federal proposal is considered significant, and thus
required preparation of an EIS.222 The mitigation plan promulgated by the
agency included various habitat conservation and protection measures,
restrictions on development, and plans to ensure the cooperation of
government agencies with jurisdiction over the affected area.223 The Service
had concluded that the measures would actually enhance the ability of the
butterfly to survive. The court noted that even if the mitigation measures
would not completely compensate for all of the projected adverse
environmental impacts, that would not necessarily require preparation of an
EIS.224 The agency's mitigation plans served to reduce the potential adverse
effects of the project, thereby obviating its "controversial" character.
circumstances would trivialize NEPA and would diminish its utility in
providing useful environmental analysis for major federal actions that
truly affect the environment.
Id. at 682 (citations omitted).
220 See id. at 683.
221 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
222 See id. at 987. The court also found that where federal project conforms to existing
land use patterns, zoning or local plans, such conformity is evidence supporting a finding
of no significant impact. See id.
223 See id.
224 See id.; see also discussion supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (analyzing the
discussion in Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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Similarly, in North Carolina v. Federal Aviation Administration,225
groups challenged a final rule issued by the Federal Aviation Administration
revoking, realigning, and establishing restricted air space over parts of the
state of North Carolina to allow the Navy to conduct practice bombing
exercises.226 Various groups voiced opposition to the rule, including the
General Accounting Office, state agencies, local governments, and
individuals, based on aeronautical, social, economic, environmental, and
procedural grounds.227 The principal environmental concerns raised by the
FAA's own analysis included noise from aircraft, danger to wildlife, and the
potential harm associated with the use of laser weapons.228 Interestingly, an
internal memorandum prepared by the FAA manager of operations had
cautioned that the Navy's proposal was "highly controversial" and also
referred to the opposition to the special use airspace.229 The Navy responded
to the concerns by twice modifying its proposal. The court, in reviewing the
government's actions, found that the "controversy" had been resolved
satisfactorily when the FAA adopted the Navy's supplemental environmental
assessment, including certain mitigation measures.230
The sufficiency and definiteness of mitigation measures are relevant
considerations in assessing whether the measures should affect the
determination of significance of the project under NEPA. In LaFlamme v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,"' for example, a group challenged
issuance of a license by the FERC permitting construction and operation of
a hydroelectric power project. The FERC had circulated the license
application to various state and federal agencies for comment, but none raised
objections or suggested modifications.232
Subsequently, there was a large outpouring of negative public
opinion, including complaints about water purification problems, harm to
vegetation and wildlife due to inadequate minimum streamflows, diminished
recreational opportunities, and harm to aesthetic interests.233 The FERC
225 957 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992).
226 See id. at 1127-28.
227 See id. at 1129.
228 See id at 1130.
229 Id.
230 See id. at 1133.
23 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988).
232 See id. at 394.
233 See id.
[Vol.2 1:1 75216
ROLE OF CONTROVERSY IN NEPA
addressed most of the concerns raised in varying degrees but concluded that
no EIS was necessary because issuance of the license did not constitute a
major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.234
In a challenge to the licensing decision, the court found both
procedural and substantive violations of NEPA by the agency. 235 The court
characterized as a "procedural" flaw the agency's failure to prepare either an
EA or a FONSI with respect to the licensing decision, having instead merely
relied upon several staff reports; this invited speculation about the project.236
Further, the agency had planned to base its mitigation plan on a post-
licensing study; this effectively eliminated true consideration of possible
alternatives as the agency eliminated independent analysis of consequences
prior to issuance of the license.237
With respect to the issue of timing, the court observed that one of
NEPA's primary goals is "to facilitate 'widespread discussion and
consideration of environmental risks and remedies associated with the
pending project"' in order to carry out an informed decisionmaking
process. 238 Necessarily, that requires that the collection and evaluation of
various ideas occur prior to approval of a course of action.239
The court viewed as a "substantive" error the agency's failure to
provide adequate support in the administrative record for its conclusions that
the project's impact on the area's recreational use and visual quality were
insignificant and that its mitigation measures were adequate.2 41 In that vein,
the court found that the public controversy pertaining to recreational use and
visual quality in the proposed affected area and the proposed mitigation
measures on preventing significant environmental degradation supported the
court's conclusion that substantial questions were raised regarding the
significance of the environmental impact.24 ' Also, the FERC failed to
234 See id. at 394-95.
23 See id. at 399.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 400.
23 Id. at 398 (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1021
(9th Cir. 1980)).
219 See id. 400; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
240 See Laflamme, 852 F.2d. at 399.
241 See id. at 400-01.
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provide a reasoned explanation to counter the public concerns.
Accordingly, the license was suspended and the agency was directed to
consider the requirements of the statutes involved.243 This result is consistent
with the policy of NEPA that an agency should be afforded discretion to
make reasoned judgments, particularly regarding complex scientific matters,
yet cannot be permitted to "put on blinders" and effectively ignore public
controversy materially related to the subject of the decision.244
In a similar vein, Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce245 involved a
challenge to a downtown center redevelopment project funded by HUD.
With respect to the relevance of mitigation measures contemplated by the
agency, the court held that such measures must be "project-related" in order
to be considered toward the determination of environmental significance.246
For instance, the court reasoned that the potential impairment of air quality
from increased traffic would not be considered "mitigated" for NEPA
purposes simply by the agency pointing to a requirement that automobiles
also must satisfy emission reduction standards under other laws.247
Further, proposed mitigation measures must have a sufficient level of
definiteness in order to permit incorporation by the agency in its project
assessment. Although commitments to undertake mitigation steps could be
made by third parties and do not necessarily require formal contractual
commitments, the court stated that they "must be more than mere vague
242 See id. at 401.
243 See id. at 403.
244 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
245 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982).
246 See id. at 860; see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986). In
Friends of the Earth, the court upheld an agency decision to issue a permit to a logging
company for discharging fill material into a wetlands area without preparing an EIS. The
adverse effects of the loss of wetlands were appropriately mitigated by a plan involving the
transfer of an "off-site" parcel of land for purposes of its conversion into a substitute
wetlands area. See id. But see Morgan v. Walter, 728 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Idaho 1989)
(finding that agency decision basing mitigation plan involving establishment of a
preservation zone to offset a proposed water diversion project was inadequately supported
to justify decision not to prepare an EIS).
247 Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 851 (stating that "[t]he significance of the adverse
environmental impact of a particular agency action cannot be obviated by pointing to the
beneficial environmental impact of a different and unrelated action").
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statements of good intentions. '248  Consequently, although some of the
mitigating factors fell short of the standard, other project-related changes
were closely planned with the city and involved firm commitments by the
developer, thus justifying the agency's reliance on such conditions as
appropriate mitigating factors.249
Promises to mitigate adverse environmental consequences in the
future do not necessarily obviate the need for preparation of EIS. 25° For
example, in Sierra Club v. Marsh,25' a group challenged plans for an
industrial development in Maine which included construction of a dry-cargo
marine terminal, adjacent commercial park, and a causeway that would
connect an island to the mainland with a road and railroad line. 2 The Corps
of Engineers and the Federal Highway Administration prepared an EA,
issued a FONSI, and granted the necessary permits and funding. 3 The
Maine voters and government agencies supported the project, approving bond
referenda to finance the state's share of costs.25 4
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit relied on several factors to determine that the project was significant
and required preparation of an EIS, including that the Corps had merely
promised to mitigate the potential adverse effects of the project in the
future.2" The court reasoned that possible mitigation, as it impacts on agency
decisionmaking, is not merely a technical requirement that, if addressed,
automatically obviates the need for EIS.256 Rather, mitigation measures must
248 Id. at 860; see also Audubon Soc'y v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding a city's offer to be bound by certain mitigating conditions inadequate to cure defect
in the permit issued for fill material to construct bridge and jogging path in connection with
a road extension); United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 760 F. Supp. 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding that a proposal to construct new postal facility impermissibly relied upon
traffic mitigation measures which lacked state approval).
249 See Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860-61.
250 See The Steamboaters v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 759 F.2d 1382, 1393-94
(9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the agency must give specific convincing explanation of how
proposed mitigation conditions will render the environmental effects of a project
insignificant).
25. 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985).
252 See id. at 872.
253 See id. at 873.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 877.
256 See id.
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be examined in light of "NEPA's underlying purpose of requiring agencies
to determine and assess environmental effects in a systematic way", to force
decisionmakers to focus on effects when making major decisions. 7
Finally, in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,258 the Court
considered whether NEPA imposes a substantive duty upon agencies to adopt
a mitigation plan to address adverse environmental effects associated with a
major federal action. The case involved a challenge to the issuance of a
special use permit for the development and operation of a major downhill ski
resort in a national forest.259 The citizens group criticized the adequacy of the
EIS prepared by the Forest Service on the basis that it failed to include a plan
to mitigate the potential adverse consequences to the environment, including
deteriorated air quality and potential losses to area wildlife.260 The Service
had considered a variety of on-site and off-site mitigation measures in the
EIS, had contemplated adoption of some steps in issuance of the permit, and
anticipated further measures could be implemented in future stages of the
process.26 ' The citizens group, though, claimed that the Forest Service had
an affirmative duty under NEPA to develop a substantive mitigation plan
prior to granting of the permit.
262
Justice Stevens, writing the majority opinion, reaffirmed the long-
standing view that NEPA's "action-forcing" procedures require agencies to
take a hard look at the environmental consequences of their actions, as well
as serve to advance the informational role of the statute.263 The Court
concluded, stating that "[a]lthough these procedures are almost certain to
affect the agency's substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA
does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process. '264  The statute, however, does not establish priorities for
governmental action nor does it elevate environmental concerns over other
interests.
257 Id. at 882.
258 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
259 See id. at 337.
260 See id. at 336.
261 See id. at 357-58.
262 See id. at 347.
263 See id. at 350 (citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1980)); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
264 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989).
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The Court recognized that both the language of the act and the CEQ's
implementing regulations contemplate that the discussion of potential steps
to mitigate adverse environmental effects plays an important function under
NEPA.265 The agency obligations under the statute pertaining to mitigation,
however, were characterized as procedural rather than substantive.266 As a
result, the Court recognized a "fundamental distinction" between a
requirement that a mitigation plan be discussed and evaluated by the agency
at relevant stages in the decisionmaking process contrasted with a
requirement that a substantive plan for mitigation actually be formulated and
adopted.267 The critical question, then, pertaining to whether the agency had
discharged its statutory obligations turns on whether the mitigation measures
were "fairly evaluated" according to the procedural strictures of the act.268
The Court observed that NEPA prohibits "uninformed" actions, not "unwise"
actions.269 Consequently, the Court reasoned, NEPA would not necessarily
be violated if one-hundred percent of the deer herd were adversely affected.27 °
Robertson is distinguishable, however, from Cabinet Mountain in that
the context for assessing agency compliance with NEPA regarding mitigation
was in the adequacy of the EIS itself, rather than whether the adoption of
mitigation measures may obviate the necessity to prepare an EIS at all. The
similarity is the emphasis on procedural compliance with the requirements
of the statute, viewing NEPA as not mandating particular results nor even
preferring "environmentally friendly" actions. Such a view gives life to the
concern that NEPA is merely a bureaucratic-oriented statute with little
empirical effects; however, the question remains as to whether in the process
of evaluation, federal agencies actually will incorporate mitigation measures
to ameliorate the adverse environmental impacts of major federal actions.
265 See id. at 351.
26 See id.
267 See id. at 352.
268 See id. The Court stated: "There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a
requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental
consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a substantive requirement
that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted, on the other." Id.
269 See id. at 351.
270 See id. at 332.
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E. Subjective versus Objective Considerations
1. Value Preferences and Psychological Factors
The question of whether subjective values, such as aesthetics or
perceptions about changing demographics associated with a project, should
be considered in the NEPA decisionmaking process has presented unique
problems for agencies and reviewing courts. In one sense, NEPA's
expansive policy can be read to encompass virtually any factor-whether
objective or subjective-that touches and impacts upon the "human
environment.""27 On the other hand, courts have recognized the need to find
tools to confine such considerations within manageable limits.
An early interesting case exploring the distinction between subjective
personal considerations and objective environmental factors for NEPA
purposes was Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn.2 72  A
neighborhood group claimed that the location of a planned HUD low-income
housing project would detrimentally affect the social character of their
middle-class neighborhood in Chicago.2 73 The group asserted that the public
housing development would not only increase the burden on schools,
transportation, and fire services, but also would bring more crime and ruin the
aesthetic and economic quality of the area.27 4 The essence of their complaint
was that low-income public housing tenants as a group showed a statistically
higher incidence of criminal behavior and property destruction than did those
in a higher social class and that HUD failed to consider the adverse social
271 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1996). The CEQ regulations define "human environment" as
follows:
Human environment shall be interpreted comprehensively to include the
natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that
environment. (See the definition of "effects" (§ 1508.8).) This means
that economic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require
preparation of an environmental impact statement. When an
environmental impact statement is prepared and economic or social and
natural or physical environmental effects are interrelated, then the
environmental impact statement will discuss all of these effects on the
human environment.
Id.
272 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975).
273 See id. at 228.
274 See id.
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effects of the tenants on the neighborhood.2 75
The court questioned whether the fears of neighbors regarding
"people pollution" is a cognizable impact factor under NEPA.2 76 The court
recognized that the broad environmental policy expressed in NEPA includes
concern for the quality of the urban environment.2 77 However, some types of
urban socio-economic effects were inherently harder to quantify and identify
than clean air and water.2 78  Consequently, in such situations greater
deference is given to agency good faith judgments.2 79 The court rejected the
plaintiff s arguments, finding that HUD did adequately consider the impact
of the housing on the "social fabric" of the community, and concluded that
the compliance with relevant zoning laws, increased burden on schools,
transportation, fire, and other services would be incremental.28 °
In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,28" ' the
Supreme Court considered the extent to which federal agencies are required
to evaluate subjective factors as cognizable "effects" in their duties under
NEPA. The case involved a challenge to the resumption of operation of one
of the nuclear power plants at Three Mile Island following the malfunction
of a different plant.28 2 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") had
considered certain "direct effects" on the environment from reopening the
plant, including the release of low-level radiation, increased fog, and the
release of warm water into a nearby river.28 3 The plaintiffs claimed, though,
that the agency had violated NEPA by failing to also consider the severe
psychological distress that area residents would experience from restarting
the plant.284 The threat to mental health was associated with fears of a
nuclear catastrophe and the dangerous effects of a release of radiation.28 '
275 See id.
276 See id. at 231. The HUD regulations implementing NEPA provided that the degree of
controversy over environmental consequences of proposed project was a consideration factor
regarding the appropriate environmental clearance procedures that should be followed. See
id. at 231-32.




281 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
282 See id. at 768.
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The Court observed that effects on human health were cognizable
under NEPA and that human health could include psychological health." 6
Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, however, observed that
NEPA is principally concerned with potential harms to the "physical"
environment.2 7 Thus, to determine whether a particular effect is relevant
under NEPA, requires an assessment of the relationship between the effect
and the change in the physical environment caused by the federal action.288
The Court compared its causation analysis to "proximate cause" in tort law,
both functioning as a pragmatic tool to limit obligation within manageable
bounds.289
Turning to the disputed agency action, the Court found that NEPA
did not require the NRC to consider psychological effects of existence of a
risk before the risk materialized. 29' The pragmatic basis for the Court's
holding was the inherent difficulty of agencies to effectively draw lines
between "genuine" claims of psychological health and those "grounded
solely in disagreement with a democratically adopted policy. '29 The Court
recognized an important public policy under NEPA involving an evaluation
of whether "the gains from any technological advance are worth its attendant
risks"; however, the fear associated with the risk of a nuclear accident was
not an "effect" caused by a change in the physical environment as
contemplated by the statute.292 The limitations of causal connection to the
286 See id. at 772.
287 See id. at 774.
288 See id. at 772. The Court observed:
The theme of § 102 is sounded by the adjective "environmental": NEPA
does not require the agency to assess every impact or effect of its
proposed action, but only the impact or effect on the environment. If we
were to seize the word "environmental" out of its context and give it the
broadest possible definition, the words "adverse environmental effects"
might embrace virtually any consequence of a governmental action that
some [sic] one thought "adverse." But we think the context of the statute
shows that Congress was talking about the physical environment-the
world around us, so to speak. NEPA was designed to promote human
welfare by alerting governmental actors to the effect of their proposed
actions on the physical environment.
Id.
289 See id. at 774.
290 See id. at 766.
29 See id. at 778.
292 See id. at 776.
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"physical environment" by the Court in Metropolitan Edison further restricts
the applicability of subjective or personal factors in the NEPA analysis.
Several years following Metropolitan Edison, in Olmsted Citizens for
a Better Community v. United States,293 various local organizations and
residents sought to enjoin a proposal for the conversion of a former state
mental hospital into a federal prisons hospital under NEPA.294 The proposal
drew strong opposition; seventy-eight percent voted against the project in a
nonbinding referendum and 2,000 people attended a public meeting to voice
their concerns. 29 ' They challenged the adequacy of the government's
consideration of various environmental factors, including allegations that the
effects of converting the mental hospital facility into a federal prisons
hospital would lead to an increase in crime in the area, negatively affect
neighborhood development, and introduce weapons and drugs. 296
The court relied upon Metropolitan Edison Co. in characterizing the
social impacts resulting from a change in the nature of the use and in the type
of persons associated with the facility, rather than from "physical changes"
connected with the project.297 Such social effects or local concerns would be
considered collateral and thus outside the scope of NEPA by virtue of lacking
a causal relationship to the environmental effects presented by the project.
The court concluded that the disagreement with the project's aims and
effects, being in the nature of a "local political dispute," should not be
resolved in the forum of a federal court.298
Interestingly, the court noted that there were no "special aesthetic
concerns" such as if the project affected a pristine wilderness area, unique,
rare, or unusual natural features, or a special scenic area.299 This could
suggest by implication not only that such aesthetic interests are cognizable
under NEPA but that public perceptions regarding the nature of the resource
affected could influence agency decisionmaking in some circumstances. The
293 793 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1986).
294 See id. at 204.
295 See id. at 209.
296 See id. at 205.
297 See id.
298 See id. at 210; see also Como-Falcon Community Coalition v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 609 F.2d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that the potential for alteration of the
character of a neighborhood from proposed job corps center does not necessarily require
preparation of an environmental impact statement).
299 See Olmsted Citizens, 793 F.2d at 206.
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court found, though, that the agency's actions in attempting to minimize
aesthetic impacts, such as through establishing a natural landscape buffer
zone between the campus and nearby residential areas, supported the agency
decision not to prepare an EIS.3°°
2. Aesthetic Considerations
Another factor considered by some courts in evaluating whether a
federal action is "highly controversial" is whether the project's aesthetic
qualities present significant environmental effects within the meaning of
NEPA. °1 In determining whether a particular dispute may be characterized
as "controversial" and therefore potentially "significant" under NEPA, courts
and federal agencies have drawn a line between opposition motivated by
personal preferences or values versus those disputes based upon an objective
relationship to the perceived environmental impacts of the proposed action.
The contours of that distinction, however, are often less than clear. Personal
distaste for the aesthetic impact of a project, even if widely shared, seldom
has influenced the agency decisionmaking process.
The reasons underlying this approach are based both in the language
of the statute and in practical recognition of the manner in which the
administrative process needs to function in order to be effective. Subjective
300 See id. at 206-07.
30l The CEQ regulations define "effects" as follows:
"Effects" include:
(a) Direct effects, which are caused by the action and occur at the
same time and place.
(b) Indirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in
time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable. Indirect effects may include growth inducing effects and
other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use,
population density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water
and other natural systems, including ecosystems.
Effects and impacts as used in these regulations are synonymous. Effects
includes ecological (such as the effects on natural resources and on the
components, structures, and functioning of affected ecosystems),
aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct,
indirect, or cumulative. Effects may also include those resulting from
actions which may have both beneficial and detrimental effects, even if
on balance the agency believes that the effect will be beneficial.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1996).
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concerns are inherently imprecise and do not lend themselves to
quantification and evaluation.30 2 To impose a duty upon an agency to fully
evaluate each personal preference would be inordinately time consuming and
costly and ultimately would probably produce little beneficial information
toward the decisionmaking process. Otherwise, the assertion of personal
value choices could be used as an effective litigation strategy to hamstring the
ability of agencies to accomplish their tasks. Limitation of the relevance of
personal value preferences, such as aesthetic concerns, is also consistent with
the procedural emphasis of the statute.
The issue was addressed in an early case under NEPA, Maryland-
National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. United States Postal
Service.3"3 The Postal Service planned to locate a bulk mail center adjacent
to a major highway. Concerns were raised that the facility would impair the
visual quality of users of the highway, and that the loading and docking areas
should be landscaped.
Judge Leventhal, writing the majority opinion, recognized that
aesthetic considerations are cognizable interests within the meaning of the
"human environment. '30 4 The judge drew support for that conclusion from
section 101(b)(2) which states one policy of the act is to "assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing
302 See River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445
(7th Cir. 1985). In River Road, neighborhood group and the State of Illinois mounted
opposition to the issuance of a permit, by the Army Corps of Engineers, for a temporary
barge fleeting facility on the Mississippi River. The principal objection was that the Corps
failed to adequately consider the detriment to the aesthetics of the area if the barge facility
were constructed. In upholding the agency action, the court observed:
Aesthetic objections alone will rarely compel the preparation of an
environmental impact statement. Aesthetic values do not lend themselves
to measurement or elaborate analysis. The necessary judgments are
inherently subjective and normally can be made as reliably on the basis
of an environmental assessment as on the basis of a much lengthier and
costlier environmental impact statement.
Id. at 451.
303 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
304 See id. at 1038; see also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 832 (2d Cir. 1972)
(holding that a proposed federal jail in Manhattan harmonized architecturally with existing
buildings in area and could even enhance the appearance of the neighborhood.); Havasupai
Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1500 (D. Ariz. 1990) (finding that agency
properly considered cultural, historic, and religious concerns of tribe in EIS).
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surroundings."30 5 The court carefully explained, however, that recognition
of aesthetic interests as relevant to agency evaluation did not necessarily
require certain results in the decisionmaking process:
That some, or perhaps all, environmental impacts have an
esthetic facet, does not mean that all adverse esthetic impacts
affect environment. That is neither good logic nor good law.
Some questions of esthetics do not seem to lend themselves
to the detailed analysis required under NEPA for a § 102(c)
impact statement. Like psychological factors they "are not
readily translatable into concrete measuring rods." The
difficulty in precisely defining what is beautiful cannot stand
in the way of expressions of community choice through
zoning regulation. But the difficulties have a bearing on the
intention of Congress, and whether it contemplated, for
example, a requirement of a detailed "environmental impact
statement," and concomitant investigation, because of the
possibility that each new Federal construction would be ugly
to some, or even most, beholders, on such issues as: Is this
proposed building beautiful? Or, what is the esthetic effect of
placing the "controversial" Picasso statute in front of the
Civic Center building in Chicago?3 6
The court further observed that it was beyond the scope of the
305 Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
487 F.2d 1029. The court stated:
This language was taken from the Senate version of the Bill, in
Conference, H. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969), U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1969, p. 2751. The Senate Report No.
91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 stated: "Each individual should be
assured of safe, healthful, and productive surroundings in which to live
and work and should be afforded the maximum possible opportunity to
derive physical, esthetic, and cultural satisfaction from his environs."
And esthetics have played a part in court protection of environmental
values even prior to NEPA, as appears from Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) and the court's advertence to
the affected Hudson river scenery as "finer than the Rhine."
Id. at 1038.
306 Id. (citations omitted).
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agency's duty to take a hard look at problems which essentially pertained to
differences in perspective because of individual taste or personal
preferences. °7 Aesthetic considerations, being inherently subjective, would
present intractable problems in application and analysis. The court concluded
that the assessment by the agency had appropriately and sufficiently dealt
with the potential aesthetic impact of the facility in its landscaping plans.3" 8
A recent illustration of the evaluation of the role of public controversy
in the NEPA decisionmaking process is Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.0 9 The case involved a challenge
to the grant of a license by the FERC for the construction and operation of a
hydroelectric power station. Opponents of the licensing decision included
local residents, two governors of Vermont, and both United States Senators
from Vermont.310 They claimed that the project was inconsistent with the
historic and aesthetic character of the area and would have unacceptably
adverse impacts on recreation.31'
The court acknowledged that the controversial character of the license
was a relevant factor in assessing the significance of the project under NEPA
but also noted that the CEQ regulations did not prescribe the weight to be
given to each factor.3"2 The court focused on the mandate of procedural
compliance under the statute, observing that "once an agency has made a
decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court
is to ensure that the agency has considered the environmental
consequences." '313 Despite the strong opposition to the project, the court
found that the agency had discharged its procedural duties under NEPA. 14
The court distinguished between "controversy" and "opposition" to
the project-the former potentially affecting agency duties under NEPA and
the latter simply reflecting the reality that virtually all projects have critics.315
Because the nature of the criticism was principally on aesthetic grounds, the
307 See id.
308 See id. at 1039.
309 968 F.2d 1549 (2d Cir. 1992).
310 See id. at 1551-52.
311 See id. at 1553.
32 See id. at 1556.
s33 Id. (citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Carlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980)).
314 See id.
311 See id. at 1557.
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court concluded that aesthetic objections alone are "seldom enough" to
influence agency duties because they are inherently subjective.316 Since that
criticism was on a subjective level, a more extensive EIS would not serve a
useful purpose and facilitate the agency's decisionmaking responsibilities
under the Act.
NEPA is a wide-sweeping statute that seeks, in its action-forcing
procedural mandate, to force all federal agencies to assess a broad range of
factors in the decisionmaking process. The talisman of "human
environment" is the relationship of people to the environment. The concept
of "effects," according to the CEQ, specifically includes a reference to
aesthetics.317 Thus, where aesthetic interests are related to an environmental
impact, NEPA requires federal agencies to take such concerns into account.
The difficulty in that assessment, though, is finding an appropriate middle-
ground to fairly accommodate the public concerns while not unduly
burdening agencies. Courts that simply cast aside aesthetic concerns
improperly fail to consider the breadth of NEPA's reach and undercut another
aim of the policy of incorporating public involvement in the decisionmaking
process. Reliance on the procedural emphasis of the statute should not be
used as a lightning rod to eliminate in appropriate circumstances
consideration of legitimate environmental effects, even those of a subjective
nature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The structure of NEPA contemplates two principal objectives:
infusing environmental considerations into the mission of all federal agencies
and engaging a wider audience in the decisionmaking process. The
mechanism by which these goals are accomplished is principally by certain
"action-forcing" procedural requirements of investigation, study, and analysis
of significant environmental impacts on the human environment. Although
no particular result is dictated nor specific environmental preferences are
established, the NEPA process is intended to facilitate better decisions.318 In
316 See id.
317 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1996).
318 See id. § 1500.1(c) ("Ultimately... it is not better documents but better decisions that
count. NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to
foster excellent action.").
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order to achieve the statutory goals, relevant information must be obtained
pertaining to proposed major federal actions. In the process of disclosure and
pursuit of useful information about environmental consequences,
disagreement often surfaces regarding the propriety of certain alternative
courses of government action. Where the nature of the disagreement or
opposition is of a substantial character, it may ultimately affect the duties of
the lead agency.
A comprehensive, multi-factored approach should be adopted to guide
federal agencies and reviewing courts to evaluate whether opposition to a
major federal project is "highly controversial" and therefore influences the
determination of "significance" within the meaning of section 102(2)(C).
Thus, with respect to issues of legitimate scientific debate which could serve
a useful purpose if integrated into the agency's analysis, the NEPA goals of
better decisionmaking would be furthered. The methodology proposed
reconciles the twin aims of the statute and reinforces the role of active and
meaningful public participation. Agencies still would retain considerable
discretion regarding procedural implementation and substantive
decisionmaking; however, that discretion would be tempered by the idea of
fully considering relevant disputed information.
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